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The Publicity of Meaning and the 




The paper presents a number of empirical arguments for the perceptual view of speech com-
prehension. It then argues that a particular version of phenomenal dogmatism can confer 
immediate justification upon belief. In combination, these two views can bypass Davidso-
nian skepticism toward knowledge of meanings. The perceptual view alone, however, can 
bypass a variation on the Davidsonian argument. One reason Davidson thought meanings 
were not truly graspable was that he believed meanings were private (unlike behavior). But 
if the perceptual view of speech comprehension is correct, then meanings (or at least conveyed 
meanings) are public objects like other perceivable entities. Hence, there is no particular 
problem of language comprehension, even if meanings originate in “private” mental states.
Introduction
Consider the following two views of language comprehension:
 Inferential view: We hear the sounds associated with a speaker’s utterance and 
infer (likely unconsciously but not necessarily on a subpersonal level) 
what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics 
of the language together with background information. 
Perceptual view: Fluent speakers of a language have a non­inferential capac­
ity to auditorily (or otherwise) perceive not just the sounds of speech 
but also what was said or conveyed by the speaker.
There are no doubt circumstances in which the inferential view of language 
comprehension is correct. Suppose upon your return from the mall I hear you 
say ‘I just bought a new goat’ (Balcerak­Jackson, manuscript). It perceptually 
seems to me that you just said that you bought a new goat. But I make the 
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inference that since you went to the mall and hate goats, you could not possibly 
have said that you just bought a new goat. I conclude that I probably misheard 
what you said and that you actually said that you board a new coat. 
An interesting question – the most central question of this paper – is whether 
there ever are situations where we perceive meanings without going through 
a rational inference process, as suggested by advocates of the perceptual view. 
Thinkers have been divided on this question (see e.g. Fricker, 2003 & Brogaard, 
2016 in favor & O’Callaghan against). Those in favor of the perceptual view 
typically combine the view with a thesis about justification, viz. the thesis that 
when we hear a speaker’s utterance, the experience confers some degree of justi­
fication on our beliefs about what was said in the absence of defeaters (Fricker, 
2003; Brogaard, 2016). So, in the absence of defeaters, we can come to know 
what was said merely on the basis of hearing the utterance.
In combination the two views, the perceptual view and the justificatory view, 
provides us with a plausible response to the skeptical argument that we cannot 
come to know what speakers say. In this paper, I will first define the perceptual 
view mostly on empirical grounds. I will then briefly consider some consider­
ations for and against the epistemic component of the perceptual view. Final­
ly, I will show how the combined perceptual and epistemic views can defeat 
Davidsonian skepticism, and that the perceptual view on its own can defeat a 
variation on the skeptical argument against knowledge of meaning.
2. The Perceptual View
On the perceptual view, speakers at least sometimes sensorily grasp meanings. 
Suppose again that upon returning from the mall, it appears to me that you 
tell me ‘I bought a new goat’. On the basis of background information I can 
come to the conclusion that you said that you bought a new coat. However, 
this is not what it appears to me that you said. What appears to me is that you 
said is that you bought a new goat. Here the perceptual view implies that you 
sensorily grasp the meaning that you bought a new goat.
A couple of remarks are in order here. First, what is perceived is the apparent 
utterance meaning, not something more complex. If you say ‘I bought a new 
coat’ but it appears to be that you uttered ‘I bought a new goat’, then I perceive 
the utterance meaning that you bought a new goat. It is a different question 
altogether whether I also perceive that you said that you bought a new coat. I 
shall leave this question to one side here. 
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It may be asked, however, what the difference is between perceiving that 
something is the case and perceiving meanings. Suppose you tell me that the 
tomato is red. What I perceive is the proposition that the tomato is red. But 
on the assumption that perception has content, this is also what I perceive if 
I look at a red tomato. So, what is the difference? The main difference, in my 
view, is the way the meaning or proposition represents the external environ­
ment. In the former case, it represents it in a testimonial way, in the latter it 
presents in a visual way. The manner of representation thus differs in the two 
cases (Chalmers, 2004). Now, if I form a belief on the basis of the experience 
of the utterance meaning, I don’t come to believe that the tomato is red. Rath­
er, what I come to believe is that you said that the tomato is red. So, there is 
an asymmetry between the content of experiences of utterance meanings and 
beliefs about utterance meanings based on those experiences. 
Second, the utterance meaning perceived is what appears to be conveyed by 
the speaker. What is conveyed may be different from or add to the perceived 
semantic meaning of the utterance. If after you have left plates in the sink for 
several days your roommate loudly states ‘the dishes are dirty’, what is conveyed 
presumably is not just that the dishes are dirty but also that you should wash 
them. If you say ‘I haven’t had breakfast’, what you convey is not the semantic 
meaning that you have not have breakfast (ever) but rather that you have not 
had breakfast that very morning. On my take on the perceptual view, what is 
perceived is the apparent conveyed meaning, not the semantic meaning (if we 
ever have knowledge of semantic meanings when the latter are not conveyed, 
these meanings are typically inferred).
This latter point provides a natural response to an objection people often 
raise to a main consideration in favor of the perceptual view, viz. the view that 
differences in phenomenology between listening to known and unknown lan­
guages is traceable to differences in semantic properties presented in auditory 
experience (Bayne, 2009; Siegel, 2005; Pettitt, 2010; O’Callaghan, 2011; 
Reiland, 2015a). 
The objection turns on the observation that most words are highly poly­
semous (O’Callaghan, 2011). Casey O’Callaghan (2011) agrees that there is 
a difference in phenomenology between listening to speech in known and 
unknown languages, but he argues against the claim that the phenomenal 
contrast is best explained in terms of our auditory perception of meanings. 
The phenomenal contrast is better understood in terms of our ability to dif­
ferentiate language­specific phonological properties of the known language. 
Although this hypothesis is consistent with the view that we can non­infer­
entially perceive the content of speech, this explanation of the phenomenal 
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contrast between listening to known and unknown languages indicates that 
O’Callaghan would argue against the view that we can perceive meanings and 
have auditory sensory phenomenology associated with them. 
In arguing against the hypothesis that the phenomenal contrast between lis­
tening to a known and an unknown language is best explained by the hypoth­
esis that we can hear meanings, O’Callaghan brings up the case of homo­
phones. Homophones are expressions that are pronounced the same way but 
differ in meaning. They include homonyms, which share a spelling, as in the 
case of ‘bank’ (financial institution) and ‘bank’ (river bank), and heterographs, 
which do not share a spelling but are nonetheless pronounced the same way, 
such as ‘pole’ and ‘poll’. Two utterances of the homophones ‘pole’ and ‘poll’ 
involve acoustically identical sounds. When listening to those sounds, we do 
not detect any difference in phenomenal character, despite the potential dif­
ference in meaning.
This is the gist of O’Callaghan’s case against the view that the phenomenal 
contrast between listening to known and unknown languages is best explained 
in terms of an auditory experience of meanings. When the argument is under­
stood in this way, it does not establish the hypothesis that the phenomenal 
contrast is not best explained perceptually (cf. Reiland, 2015a). Procedural/
functional words, such as ‘but’, ‘or’, ‘and’ and ‘not’ can perform a multiplicity 
of functions in the language. For instance, the sentence ‘Otavio is in his office, 
and he is writing’ is true just in case both conjuncts are true. ‘Otavio might 
be in his office, and he might be in Brazil’, on the other hand, is true just in 
case one of the conjuncts is true. The general linguistic meaning of procedur­
al/functional words, such as ‘but’, ‘or’, ‘and’ and ‘not’ is normally inaccessible 
to consciousness. But so is the lexical meaning of descriptive words, such as 
‘chair’, ‘healthy’ and ‘door’ because of the massive polysemy of ordinary lan­
guage (Recanati, 2004). ‘Chair’, for instance, could mean (among many other 
things) a seat for one person, the head of a department or organization, and an 
office of position or authority (e.g. ‘the new research chair of neuroscience’). 
Even if one could come up with some exhaustive disjunctive lexical entry speci­
fying the multiple linguistic functions of procedural and descriptive words, it 
is implausible to think that we ordinarily comprehend speech by consciously 
accessing such complex lexical entries. If, however, linguistic meaning eludes 
consciousness, it can be neither perceived nor grasped. 
What is accessible to consciousness is the utterance (or occasion) meaning 
of a particular use of a word. We have no trouble accessing the meaning of an 
utterance of the sentence ‘The patient is healthy but she is still not eating any­
thing healthy’, despite the different occurrences of the highly polysemous word 
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‘healthy’. The utterance meaning we comprehend in individual instances are 
what we use as evidence when theorizing about linguistic meanings. Linguistic 
meanings are thus in some sense theoretical constructs.
These considerations point to a problem with O’Callaghan’s argument, 
if construed as an argument against experiencing semantic properties.1 The 
sounds associated with the words ‘pole’ and ‘poll’ are indeed identical yet the 
words mean different things. My reply: simply pronouncing these words is not 
a case of using the words. It is merely a case of pronouncing the sounds associ­
ated with two different lexical entries. Yet, as already argued, we cannot hear 
the meaning of sounds associated with lexical entries because the meanings of 
lexical entries are ineffable; they are not ordinarily accessible to consciousness. 
So, the simple argument from homophony does not work.
O’Callaghan preempts something like this objection but proceeds by arguing 
that the lack of difference in phenomenology persists even when we focus on 
particular uses of the words ‘poll’/’pole’. He invites us to listen to utterances 
of ‘Ernest used the pole to vault over the high bar’, ‘Last year Mac visited the 
southern pole of Earth’, and ‘Bubb won the greatest number of votes in our 
latest poll’. O’Callaghan maintains that even when uttered as part of a sen­
tence, we will be unable to attend to anything audible in the three utterances 
of ‘poll/pole’’ that makes them different. 
My reply: It seems, however, that the specific meanings of the homophones 
do make a difference to the phenomenology of the listening experiences. If 
the same sounds (‘poll’/’pole’) appeared in a foreign language, as in the case of 
an utterance of the Danish sentence ‘Giv dukken til Poll’,2 the experience of 
the word would be different. We would have no impression of experiencing a 
meaning. In fact, O’Callaghan’s own explanation of the phenomenal contrast 
between listening to a known language and a foreign language, which we will 
revisit below, has exactly the same alleged problematic implication.
Having rejected that an auditory experience of meanings can explain the 
phenomenal contrast between listening to a known language and listening to 
a foreign language, O’Callaghan owes us a different explanation of the phe­
nomenal contrast. His explanation turns on our familiarity with the sounds of 
a language. Learning a language, he argues, changes the temporal and quali­
tative features that speech sounds are experienced as having. When we learn 
 1 This is not to say that O’Callaghan’s intention in putting forth the argument was to establish 
that we don’t perceive semantic properties but only that one might potentially use this sort 
of argument to attempt to show that we don’t perceive semantic properties.
 2 Here we can imagine that someone is simply named ‘Poll’, pronounced like the English word. 
The utterer would then be asking someone to give the doll to Poll. 
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a language we become better at detecting the language­specific phonetic and 
phonological properties of the language, which alters how the sounds are expe­
rienced.
This explanation of differences in phenomenology between familiar and 
foreign languages faces several challenges, however. First, it cannot explain 
the feeling that there is an immediately perceptible difference between differ­
ent “in­context” utterances containing different homophones (e.g., ‘pole’ and 
‘poll’).
Second, two different languages can have exactly the same speech sounds 
but nonetheless have different meanings associated with those speech sounds 
(Brogaard, 2016). Even though the speech sounds are the same, learning the 
language nonetheless changes the phenomenology of our overall experiences of 
utterances in the language. The most plausible explanation of this phenomenal 
contrast is a shift in the perception of what was said.
Third, the debate about whether one can hear the meaning of utterances car­
ries over to written and figurative language, including braille and sign language. 
There is, arguably, a phenomenal difference between looking at or touching a 
message written in a known language and a message written in a foreign lan­
guage. If we are immediately aware of the content of the message, then this 
could plausibly be taken to explain the difference in phenomenology. But if we 
merely see the configuration of the letters of the message and then go through 
a number of inferences to reach an interpretation, then a different explanation 
of the difference in phenomenology between seeing a message written in a 
known language versus a foreign language is called for. Changes in the tempo­
ral and qualitative features that speech sounds seem to have cannot explain the 
phenomenal difference in this case, and, as we will see below, it is questionable 
that learning a language can change the qualitative features that graphemes are 
experienced as having without our also having an auditory experience of what 
the message communicates.
3. Empirical Evidence for the Perceptual View
Before we turn to the skeptical argument against the possibility of knowledge 
of meaning, let me outline four pieces of empirical evidence in favor of the 
perceptual view of speech comprehension. The first piece of evidence for the 
view comes from the standard Stroop effect. The Stroop effect, in its classical 
form, is an effect found when attention­grabbing word meaning interferes with 
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the naming of the ink the words are printed in. For example, if the word ‘red’ 
is printed in the ink color green, then it is harder to name the ink color than if 
it had been printed in red (or black). It typically takes longer to name the ink 
color when it does not match the word meaning. We are also more prone to 
mistakes when the ink color is contrary to the color depicted by the word. One 
possible explanation of this effect is that the meaning of the word captures our 
attention and thereby distracts us from the task we are supposed to carry out.
Fig. 1:  The word ‘blue’ is here displayed in the color red and the word ‘green in the color 
‘blue’, and so on. It takes longer for subjects to name the color of the ink when the 
word is printed in a color that differs from the color designated by the word than 
when it is printed in black or the same color as the color designated.
The standard explanation of this attentional bias is that the processing of mean­
ing in the sensory cortex interferes bottom­up level with the intellectual nam­
ing task. The effect thus appears to indicate that the processing of meanings 
occur at the perceptual level, which points to the perceptual view of meaning 
comprehension.
A second piece of empirical evidence in favor of the perceptual view comes 
from a variation on a standard visual search paradigm. When shown an array 
of a meaningful word (the target) and meaningless variations on that word (the 
distractors), the meaningful word pops out and immediately grabs our atten­
tion (Fig. 2). Visual search paradigms are supposed to be a test of whether expe­
rience requires focused attention. If experience of meanings does not require 
focused attention, then the target item should capture attention, which would 
lead to highly efficient (fast and accurate) identification of the target. If, on 
the other hand, experience of meaning does require focal attention, then the 
target word should not capture attention and the identification process should 
be inefficient (slower and less accurate). Perceptual features must be processed 
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early enough in the visual system for them to attract attention and lead to segre­
gation (Beck, 1966; Treisman, 1982). So the appearance that experiences of the 
meanings of words among pseudowords can lead to pop­out and segregation 




Fig. 2:  The word ‘telephone’ pops out in an area of words and pseudowords. This test indi-
cates that we perceive meaningfulness rather than meaning as such. 
It should be noted that this particular test is not aiming at showing directly 
that we perceive word meanings but rather whether the property of being 
meaningful is presented in perceptual experience. However, there is good rea­
son to think that the ability to perceptually determine meaningfulness nor­
mally depends on being able to perceptually determine particular meanings. 
For example, in order to experience ‘telephone’ as meaningful, you must have 
perceptual access to the meaning of ‘telephone’. If this is so, however, the pop­
out effect indicates that individual meanings normally are also presented in 
low­level perception.
A third empirical test that meanings are presented in experience turns on the 
notion of evidence insensitivity. We know from the case of visual experience of 
low­level features that these experiences are evidence insensitive. For instance, 
in the Müller­Lyer Illusion, even after being told that the line segments have 
the same length, they seem to have the different lengths (Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3:  The Müller-Lyer Illusion. Even when you learn that the line segments on the left 
have the same length, they continue to appear as if they have different length. This 
indicates that low-level experience is evidence insensitive.
Low­level perceptual experiences are thus normally insensitive to counterevi­
dence. Experiences of utterances are likewise evidence insensitive. Consider 
(from Longworth, 2008):
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 (1a)  More people have been to France than I have.
 (1b)  The shopkeepers were unsatisfied by midnight.
 (1c)  That’s the first time that anyone sang to me like that before.
The sentences in (1) are not grammatically meaningful. Even so, the appearance 
that an utterance of a sentence like ‘More people have been to France than I 
have’ is meaningful may persist even after we realize that it is, in fact, incom­
prehensible, which means that experiences of the meaningfulness of these sen­
tences are evidence insensitive. This indicates that the property of being gram­
matically meaningful is presented in experiences of speech. Now, saying this 
is different from saying that particular word meanings are presented in the 
perceptual exposure to utterances, but to the extent that a grasp of meaningful­
ness depends on a grasp of individual meanings, it does suggest that particular 
meanings may be presented in experience. 
A fourth piece of empirical evidence in favor of the perceptual view comes 
from cases of semantic priming. In the standard priming task, study partici­
pants see a prime word (e.g., ‘nurse’) presented on a computer screen. They 
then see a target word (e.g., ‘doctor’) presented on the screen. When asked to 
respond to a target word,, subjects respond faster and more accurately to the 
target if the target is semantically, pragmatically and/or associatively related 
to the prime (as in ‘doctor’ versus ‘forest’) (see e.g. Neely & Kahan 2001). In 
a variation on the standard paradigm, a mask is presented briefly after the 
prime is presented. This ensures that the prime is processed below the level 
of conscious awareness. Even in masked priming experiments, the volunteers’ 
responses to the target words that are semantically, pragmatically and/or asso­
ciatively related to the prime tends to be faster and more accurate than if the 
target word is not related in this way (Fig. 4). 
A traditional explanation of semantic priming is that the prime activates 
representational memory neurons, which in turn facilitates the processing 
of the target word (see e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975). This mechanism has 
received additional backing after the reinstatement theory of memory gained 
traction (Eichenbaum, 2004; Serences et al., 2009; Rissman and Wagner, 2012). 
According to the latter theory of memory, memory retrieval consists in a rein­
statement of activity in the neural circuits that were initially involved in pro­
cessing the external stimulus. For example, when retrieving a visual memory, 
activity is reinstated in the visual cortex, whereas an activity is reinstated in 
the auditory cortex and other neighboring areas when retrieving an auditory 
memory. Hearing a recognizable word likely reinstates activity in the Wer­
nicke’s area, which is located in the superior temporal gyrus right next to the 
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auditory cortex. Wernicke’s area is involved in utterance comprehension and 
understanding of written language. As in all cases of sensory recognition, sen­
sory brain regions outside the primary sensory areas are invoked in the process. 
For example, seeing a blue dot will activate the primary visual cortex as well 
as the color areas in the visual cortex (or slightly outside of the visual cortex). 
Likewise, restatement of activity in the areas originally used to comprehend a 
given prime word likely facilitates processing of semantically, pragmatically or 
associatively related words whose encoding overlaps with the encoding of the 
prime. This can explain the faster and more accurate responses to target words 
that are semantically, pragmatically or associatively related to their primes. It 
also points to the perceptual view of speech comprehension as the most com­
pelling theory of utterance comprehension.
Fig. 4:  Standard masked priming. Subjects are exposed briefly to a word. The word is then 
covered by a mask. Finally, the target word is presented to them. Subjects’ respond 
more quickly when the prime is semantically related to the target word. For example, 
in this case the target and the prime word rhyme, which speeds up the recognition 
of the target word.
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4.  Immediate Justification of Belief
If utterance comprehension is sensory in nature, as the empirical evidence 
indicates, then the question is whether experiences of what is said can justify 
our beliefs about what was said without drawing on background information. 
This latter view – also known as ‘phenomenal dogmatism’ – has had its sup­
porters and opponents (see e.g. Pryor, 2000; Huemer , 2001; Huemer, 2007; 
Tucker, 2010; Brogaard, 2013; Brogaard, 2016; Chudnoff, 2014 for arguments 
in favor and Markie, 2005; Siegel 2012 for arguments against) According to the 
phenomenal dogmatist, at least some perceptual appearances provide imme­
diate and full justification for belief in the absence of defeaters. But not all 
appearances are of the kind that can provide immediate and full justification 
for belief. Consider the following illustration (Fig. 5):
Fig.5:  The dog is partially occluded. The truth-conditions for your appearance of the dog 
include both the proposition that that is a dog and awareness of the truth-maker for 
that proposition but it does not include awareness of the dog’s tail. So, while your 
experience of the dog has presentational phenomenology, your experience that the 
occluded parts are parts of a dog does not.
If it perceptually appears to me that what is hidden behind the occlusion is part 
of a dog, and I come to believe it, this appearance does not by itself justify my 
belief. At best, it confers justification on my belief together with background 
assumptions about dogs and tails. 
This raises the question: what distinguishes those appearances that have the 
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features required in order to confer immediate justification on belief from 
those that do not?
Elijah Chudnoff has argued that only appearances with a presentational phe­
nomenology confer immediate justification upon belief, that is, phenomenal 
dogmatism should be restricted to those cases in which appearances have a pre­
sentational character, such as the appearance of the whole dog ‘popping’ out in 
front of your eyes (Chudnoff 2014; cf. Chudnoff 2013, p. 90, p. 94; Chudnoff, 
2016; Chudnoff forthcoming).
To a first approximation, experiences have presentational character only 
when their accuracy conditions ‘include both p and awareness of a truthmaker 
for p’ (Chudnoff, Forthcoming b). Returning to the occluded dog, your visual 
experience of the dog makes you aware of the proposition that the dog is sit­
ting as well as the truthmaker for that proposition, but it does not make you 
aware of a truthmaker for the proposition that the dog has a short tail, a long 
tail or no tail or that the tail continues in one direction rather than another. On 
this view, the content of an experience of the sitting dog is not simply the dog 
is sitting but something like: that dog is sitting, and it seems that I am aware of 
a truthmaker for the proposition that that dog is sitting. Experiences of occluded 
parts of objects have a different content. For example, an experience of the 
occluded part of the dog being part of a dog might have the content: that part 
is part of that dog but I am not aware of a truthmaker for the proposition that that 
part is part of that dog.
Chudnoff’s proposal, however, runs into trouble with respect to experiences 
of what is said by sound sequences. The trouble is that auditory sequences give 
rise to the illusion of auditorily experienced meanings that appear to be evi­
dence insensitive in just the same way as lower­level visual illusions (cf. Long­
worth, 2008). Yet it is quite implausible that we are aware of any apparent truth 
makers for the content of the experience of meanings. For example, we are not 
directly aware of the speaker’s intentions. 
A better candidate to be what distinguishes those experiences that confer 
justification on belief without background assumptions from those that do 
not is felt evidence sensitivity. Felt evidence sensitivity differs from evidence 
sensitivity in that the latter is a dispositional property, whereas the former is a 
featur of the phenomenology of experience. When looking at the Muller­Lyer 
illusion, for example, it feels to us that no amount of evidence could change 
how we feel about the perceived length of the lines. Likewise, in speech com­
prehension, when faced with an utterance of a sentence of the type in 1(a)­(c), 
we have a feeling that no knowledge of grammaticality could undermine the 
appearance of meaningfulness.
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Here is another example: suppose a colleague of yours is known for being 
critical of virtually every department colloquium talk. As you enter the wine 
and cheese reception following the talk, it seems to you that your colleague 
is saying ‘the speaker misunderstood my question’ when in reality he uttered 
the sounds ‘the speaker was really good in response to my question’. If you are 
told that your colleague said the latter but not the former, this may not change 
the appearance that the speaker said the former. Your experience represents the 
apparent meaning of the utterance as resistant to counterevidence. You heard 
what you heard after all. You feel that evidence simply could not possibly refute 
the appearance itself but only your belief. In such cases, experiences of meaning 
can have the same evidence sensitivity or felt evidence sensitivity as low­level 
experiences. It is this felt resistance to counterexamples that some experiences 
have that makes them good candidates to be an immediate justifier of belief. 
This is because felt evidence sensitivity typically tracks the truth. When we feel 
certain about what we appear to see or hear, our experiences are more likely 
than not to be veridical, at least in normal non­demon plagued worlds. 
5. The Skeptical Argument Against Knowledge of Meaning
This finally leads us to a significant virtue of the perceptual view. One major 
challenge to the inferential view of utterance comprehension is that it lends 
itself to the view that we cannot come to know the meanings of utterances, 
or the even more radical view that meanings themselves are indeterminate. 
As Dean Pettit (2010) has argued, the problem arises owing to the epistemic 
implications of the inferential view for language acquisition. Acquiring a cor­
rect belief set about the syntax and semantics of the language doesn’t suffice for 
comprehending what speakers say; those beliefs would also need to be justified. 
This is the idea underlying Davidson’s (1973) thought experiment of the radi­
cal interpreter who is faced with the task of interpreting a completely foreign 
language. The theorist interprets the language on the basis of the available evi­
dence, which are observations of the linguistic and non­linguistic behavior of 
the speakers. The problem is that the available evidence underdetermines facts 
about meaning, since that evidence is compatible with rival hypotheses about 
the meaning of the utterances. This leads Davidson to argue not merely that 
we cannot come to know the meaning of the utterances we hear but also that 
there are no determinate facts about meaning, because facts about meaning 
cannot outstrip the ability of all the speakers of a language.
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This sort of skepticism does not follow from the perceptual view of language 
comprehension when combined with the thesis that experience can confer 
immediate justification upon belief, because on the latter view, our experi­
ences of what is said immediately justify our beliefs about what is said without 
any reliance on further belief or theorizing, at least in the absence of defeaters. 
So, in the absence of defeaters, our beliefs about the meanings of utterances 
are justified.
When combined with the epistemic hypothesis, the perceptual view thus has 
the advantage over the inferential view insofar as it can block a potential route 
to a radical view of language comprehension (cf. McDowell, 1978; McDow­
ell, 1981).3 The problem with this solution to the skeptical problem is that it 
requires that one accepts the epistemic component of the view. But, as we have 
seen, there may be reason to reject this part of the perceptual view. There is, 
however, a different route to blocking the skeptical argument that does not rely 
on the epistemic component. 
The idea that we can come to know what speakers say by listening to them 
and otherwise observing them seems to be doomed if meanings are private. If, 
however, meanings are public, then they ought to be discoverable like other 
public objects. Perceivable objects arguably are public. So, if meanings are per­
ceivable, then they are public and arguably are discoverable. The argument can 
presented more succinctly as follows:
 (1) Are meanings private or public? If they are private, how do we grasp 
them? 
 (2) If they are perceivable, then they are public just like other perceivable 
objects.
 (3) Hence, there is no particular problem of language comprehension, 
even if meanings originate in “private” mental states.
This argument is consistent with the thought that experiences of what is said 
do not by themselves confer justification on belief. Suppose you tell me ‘I 
bought a new coat’. Suppose further that I perceive you as having said that 
you bought a new goat but despite knowing that you went to the mall and 
hate goats I irrationally form the belief that you said that you bought a new 
goat. An exponent of the view that experiences of utterance meanings can 
confer immediate justification upon belief can say that your irrational belief is 
 3 There are, of course, other ways to block the Davidsonian line of argument. So, this line of 
argument should not be taken to be the main reason to adopt the perceptual view of language 
comprehension.
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prima facie justified directly on the basis of the perceived meaning but that my 
background knowledge that you just went to the mall and hate goats serve as 
an undercutting defeater of the justification for my belief, that is, the defeater 
severs the justificatory relation between my experience and my belief without 
severing the basing relation between the two.
An opponent of the view that experiences of utterance meanings can confer 
immediate justification upon belief, however, can also avoid skepticism about 
knowledge of meanings and yet maintain that you do not have justification 
for your belief about what was said because your background beliefs together 
with your experience do not jointly provide full justification.4 My experience 
of what was said, the opponent might say, confers partial justification upon 
my belief. But the background information does not provide the remaining 
part of the justification needed in order for the belief to become fully justified. 
This is so because the belief that you bought a new goat is inconsistent with my 
knowledge that you hate goats but love coats and just went to the mall. Owing 
to this inconsistency, I fail to have knowledge of what was said. In other cases, 
however, my experience of what was said together with my background knowl­
edge can jointly justify my belief about what was said (e.g, in a case where it 
appears to me that you said that you just bought a new coat).
Regardless of whether you accept the epistemic component of the perceptual 
view, then, the defender of the perceptual view can thus ward off the skeptic 
about knowledge of meaning. 
6. Conclusion
Empirical evidence points to utterance comprehension being a sensory phe­
nomenon. If indeed utterance comprehension is a sensory phenomenon, then 
we can combine the view with the view that sensory experiences confers imme­
diate and full justification upon belief (in the absence of defeaters). This seems 
to provide the foundation for a compelling reply to Davidson. There is, how­
ever also another way to reply to this type of argument that does not require 
buying into the epistemic hypothesis. On this view, if utterance comprehen­
 4 The background information here is not simply that you went to the mall and hate goats but 
rather some principle to the effect that if you hate goats, you are unlikely to sincerely convey 
the information to me that you just bought a goat. It is worth pointing out that no inferential 
process is needed in order for your background beliefs and your experience to jointly justify 
your belief in those cases where your belief is indeed justified.
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sion is perceptual, the meanings conveyed – or what is said – must be public. 
But if meanings are public, then Davidson’s argument is unsound, as it depends 
on the assumption that meanings are private.5
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